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Abstrat: In the ontext of ambient networks where eah small devie must trust its neighborhood
rather than a xed network, we propose in this paper a trust management framework inspired by known
soial patterns and based on the following statements: eah mobile onstruts itself a loal level of trust
what means that it does not aept reommendation by other peers, and the only relevant parameter,
beyond some speial ases disussed later, to evaluate the level of trust is the number of ommon trusted
mobiles. These trusted mobiles are onsidered as entries in a loal database alled history for eah devie
and we use identity-based ryptography to ensure strong seurity: history must be a non-tansferable
objet.
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Le projet KAA : un point de vue sur la politique de onane
Résumé : Dans les réseaux ambiants où haque entité doit faire onane à ses voisins plutt qu'à un
réseau xe, nous proposons dans e rapport un modèle de gestion de onane fondé sur notre vision
des modèles soiaux. Chaque noeud onstruit ii un niveau loal de onane ne tenant pas ompte de
reommandations que pourraient fournir les autres noeuds. Ce paramètre dépend uniquement du nombre
de noeuds de onane renontrés en ommun ave le noeud ave lequel il veut intéragir. Chaque renontre
ave un noeud de onane permet de réer un élément dans une base de donnée loale appelée historique.
An de garantir la séurité des éléments de et historique et leur non-transférabilité, nous utilisons un
protoole ryptographique dédié à ette utilisation appelé CHE pour Common History Extration.
Mots-lés : gestion de la onane, réseau ad ho, modèle de réputation loal, protoole ryptographique
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Introdution
Nowadays, wireless ommuniations form an important aspet of smart and autonomous devies. They
provide mobility and autonomous ations by oering open solutions for anywhere and anytime onne-
tivity. In this way, the mobile as a node in a Personal Area Network is only a devie in an environment
where every objet is able to ommuniate. In suh a ontext, the apabilities oered by the wireless
ommuniations to smart objets will not be restrited simply to xed networks aesses; rather, their
peer-to-peer ommuniation apabilities will have to reeive more attention.
Devies in radio range an potentially establish self-organized networks of two or more objets. Mo-
bility during the use of more omplex servies, is beoming ommonplae and is addressed by means of
ad ho ommuniation apabilities. However, mobile entities often beome disonneted from their home
networks and have to handle unforeseen irumstanes. This notion of ambient networks also signiantly
ompliates the deployment of servies inluding the seurity. The devie needs to arry self-ontained
informations and methods to be able to make fully autonomous seurity deisions. In suh an environ-
ment where anonymous entities ould build or exhange servies, seurity and risk management ould
be seen as desired properties in order to ensure availability and robustness of these networks. Indeed,
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mobile may fae with many threats as leaking of seret information, message ontamination and node
interposition, otherwise known as man-in-the-middle attaks.
The lak of a xed network and the self-organized aspet are strong restriting onstraints and a
entral trusted entity at eah moment is inherently impossible. Moreover, ative ompromising of nodes
is a real threat that requires strong seurity mehanisms. In a deentralized management system, seurity
must fulll several objetives. First, it must protet sensitive information against unauthorized aess.
Seond, it must protet the distributed onguration algorithm from attaks. Third, it must prevent
management funtionality to be used as an attak tool, e.g., for ooding attaks.
Solutions exist as enrypted tra whih protets sensitive information; digital signatures allow ver-
iation of the authentiity of management ommuniation, proteting the operation of the distributed
algorithm and onsequently mitigate the use of management funtions for attaks. But these solutions
drastialy limit inter-operability between dierent seurity domains.
Thus, ontrasting with strong seurity, trust management framework is also needed in suh an envi-
ronment. Trust management allows us to use trust to ahieve seurity goals. It is a larger framework that
inludes both risk management and aess ontrol. Its purpose is to mitigate the risks that are present in
interations. Aording to [2℄, trust management is the apture, evaluation and enforement of trusting
intentions. It provides a unied approah to speifying and interpreting seurity poliies, redentials, re-
lationship whih allows diret authorization of seurity-ritial ations. In pratie, a trust management
sheme is usually based on a deision-making proess oupled with a reputation and/or reommendation
mehanism: neighbors of a smart devie beome the only soure of informations. In general, mostly trust
management systems onsider trust as a threshold probability.
Trust management an quikly beome too omplex and tedious for people to understand and it is a
neessity to have smart-trust systems whih an reason about new situations automatially. Automated
trust management allows us to trust software to make deisions about trust as we ourselves would do it.
It allows existing devies to be trusted in news situations and by using evidene from trusted referres
and past experiene, it automatially forms new trusting beliefs.
If trust assumes some aeptane of risk, we need to minimise risk and maximise trust. Unlike
trust, risk management is well understood (Banking, Finane and Insurane). Trust inreases eieny
in ommere or market. Trust is ritial for e-ommere to remain dynami and eient. However,
inreased trust involves inreased risk whih must be managed. Risks an be managed by using trusted
third parties. We need to be able to apture trust from the natural environment. Risk management
allows us ombine risk with trust to form trusting intentions i.e. the seurity poliy.
Aess ontrol uses authorisation information to determine whether aess to resoures should be
allowed. This is similar to enforing trusted intentions. Aess ontrol poliy enfores trusting behaviour.
This paper is organized as follows: setion 1 desribes the ontext of the KAA projet and how we
use our soial vision of the problem and how the trust is inherently present in the human soiety at eah
level. Setion 2 presents the ryptographi protool arried by eah node that permits the trust bond to
be proved or reated and details some experimental results required for our protool. Setion 3 presents
the semanti notions inherently presented in our approah, the reputation model used and treats how to
implement some soial patterns into our model. Setion 4 releases the elements of a trust poliy dedued
from the semanti desription of our model and desribes the formal proof that will have to be done.
Setion 4.2 onludes this paper.
1 Context: the KAA projet
The Knowledge Authentiation Ambient projet (KAA projet) is a ollaborative researh projet involv-
ing researh teams in omputer sienes, mathematial modelling and soial sienes. It proposes to look
for human soiety trust management mehanisms and to derive an adapted tehnologial version. We
intend to develop a trust management framework inluding seurity protools for devies that have no a
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priori relationship. Suh a model will lead naturally to a deentralized approah that an tolerate some
partial informations albeit there is an inherent element of risk for the trustee entity.
There is no one simple denition of trust. Instead, there is a system of denitions depending on
whih level of the problem we are looking at. Trust mehanisms are used by humans daily to promote
interation and they aept risk in situations where they have only partial informations. Trust allows us
to reasonnably rely on the informations or ations of another party but it is an intrinsi and subjetive
property whih may be propagated but not transferred. It is also a non-transitive notion: A → B → C
does not mean that A → C. Trust is inherently linked to risk and an be viewed as a mehanism that
permits to aept a ertain risk when one interats with others.
In this paper, we objet the idea of a reommendation mehanism, trust is onsidered in our model
in a non-transitive way. We opt for this limitation in order to avoid undesirable edge eets: rumour,
bad opinions, et. The priniple of our approah is to base our deision-making proess only on the
ations whih were beneials. Consequently, a node ould not reeive a reommendation from another
node that it has never met before beause there is no simple loal means to prove the authentiity of
this reommendation. However, this approah permits a loal reputation mehanism sine it is based on
ertied events.
1.1 Soial Patterns
Exhange is a entral and traditional objet within the soial sienes, notably in eonomy where `market
exhange' analyzes irulation of goods and servies between agents (exhange is trust-regulated, that is
to say sharing something enable unknown individuals to exhange), thus in soiology and in anthropology
where the key onept is `soial exhange', whih gathers all kinds of non-eonomi exhange between
individuals. Soial patterns may be distinguish themselves on two strongly dierentiating variables. In
one hand, the soial distane that separates two individuals that exhange, this soial distane being
able to be strong in the ase of the market and in the organization (this is the reason why the ontrat
- ommerial or labor - is so important to support exhange between unknowns) or, at the opposite, as
often in the ase of the family (inluded friends, neighbors, and other kind of strong soial bonds and
where exhange is gift-regulated) and network (as a ommunity of individuals that share something like a
life experiene, an interest in something,. . . ) where familiarity, real or virtual, pre-exists to the exhange,
allow individuals to exhange without ontrat and where exhange is trust-regulated.
On the other hand, the degree of struture of the institution, that denes the degrees of liberty
of whih the ators an dispose in order to exhange (notably the hoie of the exhange partner and
the hoie of the exhanged things); this degree an be weak, as in the network and the market where
individuals have all latitude to hoose themselves and to exhange what they want to, or strong as in
the family and the organization, institutions where exhange is more onstrained by formal hierarhies
and rules. Within eah of these four patterns, exhange would be regulated by a major mehanism and
a soial distane:
Soial Distane
Strong Weak
Degree of Strong Organization/Authority Family/Gift
struturation Weak Market/Prie Network/Trust
We think it is reasonable to onstrut a trust poliy based upon soial patterns that depends on the
type of exhange. We an dene two partiular modes of operation: a losed mode where, as in the family
ase, the trust pre-exists and an open mode where, as in an organization (ompany), the trust needs to
be established using a history-based protool. In the losed mode, ryptographi veriations will not be
absolutly required and in the open mode, trust poliies will manage the degree of risk inurred. In short:
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 Family: a ommunity with a strong soial distane and a strong degree of struture works in the
losed mode.
 Network: a ommunity with a strong soial distane and a weak degree of struture works in the
open mode using a weak authentiation for the nodes meetings.
 Market: To implement a Market-like ommunity, a money (either virtual or not) is required.
Therefore, it is possible to add a semanti value to trustor proof and reiproal proof based on the
notion of market. If you add the value of the transation in both proofs, you an ahieve this goal.
The trustor proof and reiproal proof an be automatially generated when the transation took
plae (seurity of this transation is out of the sope of this paper).
 Organization: In an organization pattern as a ompany, the losed mode is used with a strong
authentiation delivered by the imprinting station through lassial ertiation. We ould also
integrate the hierarhial parameter in our model: for example, if someone wants to talk to a
leader, the required number of ommon history elements need to be larger than if he wants to talk
to a person at the same level than him.
We an also notie that depending on the onsidered soial pattern, the semanti values assoiated to
eah history elements may be dierent. The proess to derive the trust level from the size of the history,
may also be rather dierent. We an onsider that in a family-like pattern, only one interation with
another devie of the group may be suient to aept interation, whereas in a very big organization, the
number of ommon elements between devies may graduate the authorization to various level of servies.
1.2 History based trust management framework
History-based trust management has been yet studied in the past. In [4℄ suh a trust management is
presented but it is dediated to a group signature and using trusty environment to generate elements
of history. History-based trust management may be regarded as an onsisting alternative proposal to
a pairing model requiring frequently intervention of users. Pairing model is primarily relevant in the
ase of long term assoiation between devies. For example, this approah is deployed in the built-in
seurity mehanism of the Bluetooth hip. In this mehanism, the same identiation information (a PIN
ode for example) has to be physially entered on eah devie. After the generation of a symmetri link
key, devies are able to authentiating eah other and to enrypt ommuniation. The share PIN is the
weakness of the model sine it is prone to simple o-line attak [11℄. In [18℄, a omplete trust management
framework is also proposed although it is only applied to a strongly losed environment where trust is a
boolean value: the priniple relies on removal or banishment of devies.
In our proposal, some basi informations are reorded in a history of past interations between eah
mobile with an aim of reduing the inertitude on their behavior. Two nodes ould exhange some servies
if they ould trust one to eah other and if they have a suient number of ommon previous interations
with some other nodes. We also speify our trust poliy in terms of a semanti: A is trusted for B if
ondition X is true. We also have to provide seurity poliy from our trusting beliefs and the possible
threats by reating trusting intentions. Eah elements of history are seen as a trust bond and are built
upon ryptographi tools [15℄, [20℄.
We aim to redue the omplexity of the deision-making proess inherent of all trust management
framework by relying the deision on the own-experiene of eah node. We use soial pattern as a
general framework to design our protool. This framework inludes many features suh as emergene of
spontaneous ommunities. But it is neessary in this ase, to make some extra veriations in order to
replae a trusted third party. Indeed, ertify identity is a heavy shortoming although the ryptographi
foundations of our model is strong.
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1.3 The proposed model and seurity requirements
All smart devies partiipating to this trust management arhiteture have to arry ommon spei
ryptographi algorithms and protools. This ontent is obtained through an imprinting phase before
any other interations. Speial xed funtional (supposed to be seure) units alled imprinting stations
are supposed to exist [19℄. A devie is belonging to a domain assoiated to a spei station and reeives
from these station an initial seed of trust onstruted from a master key s unique for eah station and
kept seret.
After this rst interation, eah devie's history is empty. Then, it starts reording an history based
upon the knowledge of its interations with some other nodes. The ryptographi protool desribed in
this paper ensures that any reorded element of history (generated for a spei enounter node involving
two spei nodes) annot be used by other nodes. This proved history is used to reate and enfore the
trust relation.
Before aepting any servie interation, two nodes must prove one to eah other that they an
establish a trust relation. When two nodes meet for the rst time, they searh the ommon nodes they
have met before. To prove those previous interations, they have reated together a provable value:
they have respetively signed this value. Those ommon values also prove the identities of the nodes in
presene signed by some other nodes. The ore method of the ryptographi method to do so is alled
Common History Extration protool.
This method ould be ompared to the one used in the Web of trust dened by GnuPG [8℄ done in
a non transitive way. In our model, we prove an identity and previous interations based on suessful
previous meetings but only at distane one between nodes. The identity itself is proved also by the use of
identity-based ryptography and moreover we use ellipti urves ryptography as basi bloks to design
our protool.
It appears ompletely obvious that it is neessary to build at the same time the trust poliies and
the behavior of the system when taking aount of the issue of risk assessment. Indeed, aording to the
number of ommon nodes and the nature of these elements in the respetive histories, the fulllment of
a servie might be onditioned by a ertain number of riteria. For example, it is less risky to share its
bandwidth with other nodes than oering a read (or write) aess to ondential les. In order to have
a oherent model, the various issues involving in risk assessment must be studied.
Semanti value of eah element of history plays a ruial role in our sheme. It permits to derive
an information riher and more aurate than only the intersetion of histories. This makes possible to
establish an initial level of trust based not only on the quantity of interations, but also on its quality.
Suh an extension is also out of the sope of this paper.
A trust notation or reputation priniples as proposed for example in [14℄ may be also added to
the global arhiteture. But in our proposal, we prevent a subgroup of nodes from easily destroying a
reputation of a partiular node due to the fat that eah result of interation is ryptographially proved
and thus, information upon the ommon nodes is not transitive. Compare to the PGP trust ring, an
intermediate orrupted node ould not destroy a omplete trust hain relation due to the non transitivity
of our trust establishment.
1.3.1 The initial seed of trust.
Eah devie reeives a trust germ from the imprinting stations. It is omposed by the following initial
informations: ID an identity (eMail adress or IP address or just a simple name), (SID, QID) a rst pair
of seret/publi key for ipher operations, a seond pair of keys (SSID, Q
S
ID) for the signature and a set
that represents all the publi parameters of the ellipti urves required for the dierent omputations.
Those parameters are supposed to be the same for all the imprinting stations but none of those stations
is supposed to be ertied by any authority. Moreover, an independent mobile may be its own standalone
seurity domain (it imprints itself). Another important point is that eah smart devie is sharing the same
ryptographi algorithms and protools downloaded from the imprinting station: a ngerprint algorithm,
a signature algorithm, a zero-knowledge protool, an algorithm to onstrut seure hannel and the publi
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parameters. The only values that eah smart devie has to keep seret are SID and S
S
ID as usually in
ryptosystem.
In the ontext of mobile objets with low apaity, ryptography based on ellipti urves (ECC) leads
to many advantages. In partiular, the use of suh ryptography makes it possible to develop algorithms
and protools of whih the robustness and the ost in term of omputation and spae of storage are more
advantageous than in usual ryptography.
1.3.2 How the reiproal trust may be enhaned.
At the beginning of devies' life, just after eah node has reeived its initial trust germ, history is obviously
empty of any interation. The number of ommon nodes is of ourse insuient to permit an autonomous
running and thus, it is neessary a bootstrap phase. So, two persons that want to exhange some servies
or some informations initiate an interation by foring by the hand this partiular meeting - as in a
Bluetooth like model, this gives the desired history element. After this bootstrap period, the nodes use
the ontent of their histories to aept or rejet a new interation and the human intervention is then
obvious. The benet of our protool takes all its dimension after this initial step very easy to use.
Then when two stranger nodes meet for the rst time, they exhange their history and searh their
ommon nodes (the ommon nodes that they have met before). The interation takes plae if the number
of ommon nodes is upper a given threshold. This kind of interation is built upon the soial priniple
a friend of my friend is a friend of mine. Of ourse, they need to prove one to eah other the ommon
nodes that ould be trusted. A rst node Alie has already had a past interation with Charlie, she
may prove it to Bob if Bob also already had an interation with the same Charlie. After a suessful
interation, node Alie (resp. Bob) gives a proof of interation to Bob (resp. Alie) that an be heked
by any node having a past interation with Alie (resp. Bob) in its history.
Our protool also works for two nodes from stranger domains: the authentiation notion is loal and
does not need to be strong. It omes from the ommon previous interations provided by the ontent of
the history. The identity of Alie is proved by Charlie (and some other meetings) that Bob ould verify
beause he have met Charlie. Of ourse, a lassial strong authentiation ould be performed for two
nodes of the same domain using in our ase a zero-knowledge veriation but this is not our main aim.
2 The Common History Extration (CHE) protool
In this setion we fous on the ore of the deision-making proess whih is alled Common History
Exhange protool. It is based on ryptographi material (ID-Based Cryptosystem in partiular) and
some algorithms (e.g., a searh algorithm to lookup the presene of an enounter node in a history). In [℄,
Boneh and Franklin proposed an Identity-Based Enryption (IBE) that permits to us to onstrut eah
seret/publi key pair endowed for eah node in order to build a seure hannel and thus to ipher all
ommuniation messages. The original motivation for identity-based enryption is to help the deployment
of a publi key infrastruture. More generally, IBE an simplify systems that manage a large number of
publi keys. Rather than storing a big database of publi keys the system an either derive these publi
keys from usernames, or simply use the integers 1, ... ,n as distint publi keys. We also deide to use the
Chen-Zhang-Kim's Identity-Based Signature (IBS) sheme as dened in [6℄ to sign the required elements.
Thus, eah node will have two pairs of publi/seret keys, one pair (SID, QID) for the ipher operation
and one pair (SSID, Q
S
ID) for signature purpose.
Briey speaking, when two nodes enounter themselves for the rst time, they searh for possible
ommon nodes they ould have met before. To prove an interation, they have to reate together a
provable value: this is done simply here by the signature of an agreement or a ontrat by both parties.
The terms of the agreement are alled here semanti values and are aeted for eah element of history.
One may derive from these values more information than only the simple intersetion of nodes already
enountered. This method ould be ompared to the one used in the `Web of trust' dened by GnuPG
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[8℄. However, in our approah, we do not want to prove an identity but just some previous interations.
The identity itself is proved by the use of Identity-Based Cryptography (IBC).
2.1 Identity Based Cryptosystem
Our protool also inherits some interesting features as its basi ryptographi tools are designed on
Ellipti urves. Identity based ryptography has beome a very fashionable topi in the last ouple of
years. The motivation of this onept, introdued by Shamir in 1984, was to simplify key manage- ment
and avoid the use of digital ertiates. The trik was to let a publi key be publily and uniquely
derivable from a human-memorizable binary sequene orresponding to an information non-ambiguously
identifying its owner (e-mail address, IP address ombined to a user name, soial seurity number,...)
while the assoiated private keys an only be omputed by a trusted Private Key Generator (PKG)
thanks to a master seret s. This paradigm allows bypassing the trust problems that arise in traditional
ertiate-based publi key infrastrutures (PKIs). Indeed, sine a publi key 'is' its owner's identity,
it beomes useless to bind them by a digital ertiate. Although a PKG's publi key still has to be
ertied, the need of digital ertiates is really redued as reasonably many users may depend on the
same PKG. Sine the onept's appearane in 1984, several pratial identity based signature shemes
(IBS) have been devised in the late 80's and also after 2001.
On the other hand, nding a pratial IBE remained an open hallenge until 2001 when Boneh and
Franklin proposed to use bilinear maps over algebrai urves to elegantly solve the hallenge. After
that, these fashionable bilinear maps provided plenty of other appliations inluding various partiular
kinds of signatures: blind, ring, undeniable, proxy, et. Along the evolution of publi key ryptography
from 1976, there has been a graduate evolution tending to a neessity to provide seurity proofs for
asymmetri ryptosystems in the sense that the existene of an attaker against them would imply a
probabilisti polynomial time algorithm to solve a hard number theoreti problem. In 1993, motivated
by the perspetive to ahieve provable seurity for eient protools, Bellare and Rogaway introdued the
random orale model ([1℄) that was previously impliitly suggested in [7℄ and in whih hash funtions are
used as blak box by attakers for whom they are also indistinguishable from perfetly random funtions.
Although it is well known that seurity in the random orale model does not imply seurity in the real
world as shown by several papers exhibiting pathologial ases of provably seure shemes for whih no
seure implementation exists, it still seems to be a good priniple to give seurity proofs 'at least' in the
random orale model when proposing a new asymmetri ryptosystem. In the area of provable seurity,
the last ouple of years saw the rise of a new trend onsisting of providing tight seurity redutions for
asymmetri ryptosystems ([16℄): the seurity of a ryptographi protool is said to be tightly related to
a hard number theoreti problem if an attaker against the sheme implies an eient algorithm solving
the problem with roughly the same advantage. This led several authors to provide searh for new seurity
proofs for systems that were already well known to be seure in the random orale model or for some of
their variants or to devise new shemes that, although appearantly less eient than existing ones at rst
sight, provide muh better seurity guarantees for the same seurity parameters and are then eventually
more eient for a similar desired level of seurity.
Although onerned with the provable seurity of identity based signatures, the researh ommunity
did not really fous on providing really strong seurity arguments for the various IBS proposed in the
literature up to now. Indeed, Paterson's IBS still has no formal seurity proof while Hess and Cha-
Cheon gave proofs under the Die-Hellman assumption for their respetive sheme but these proofs were
both obtained through Pointheval and Stern's forking lemma ([17℄) whih does not yield tight seurity
redutions as already argued in several previous papers ([13℄).
2.2 A general view of the CHE protool
We denote by "Common History Extration" a protool of extration of ommon aquaintanes on-
tained in the nodes' history. We deide to use the Boneh and Franklin proposition [3℄ to onstrut the
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seret/publi key pair of eah node, to ipher some messages and also to build a seure hannel with a
weak authentiation. We also deide to use the Chen-Zhang-Kim's Identity Based signature sheme as
dened in [6℄ to sign the required elements. Thus, eah node will have two pairs of publi/seret keys,
one pair (SID, QID) for the ipher operation and one pair (S
S
ID, Q
S
ID) for a signature purpose.
In order to establish a trusted interation, two nodes must prove one to eah other that they have a
suient number of ommon trusted nodes. Eah node builds its history on the base of their previous
interations with its enountered nodes and adds a semanti value desribing the nature of the link. For
example, if the interation with another node was a suess.
When two stranger nodes meet for the rst time, they exhange a part or the full ontent of the list
of their trusted nodes stored in their respetive history. Then, they searh for possible ommon trusted
nodes that they have met before. Aording to trust and seurity poliies, the interation may ontinue if
the number of ommon nodes is upper a given threshold. Of ourse, they have to prove one to eah other
that the interation really took plae. As example, we an onsider a node alled Alie who has already
had a past interation with Charlie. She ould prove it to Bob only if Bob has also had an interation
with Charlie. Futhermore, if Alie (resp. Bob) trusts Bob (resp. Alie), she (he) adds in her(his) history
an entry signed by Bob (resp. Alie). This entry an be heked by anyone having the identity of Alie
(resp. Bob) in its history. We an notie that this kind of interation is built upon the soial priniple `a
friend of my friend is a friend of mine'.
So, Alie and Bob have built in a seure hannel (reated by the IBE sheme) a message denoted
m whih may be onsidered as a reiproal trust. This message is sign respetively by both parties.
Alie publishes in her history (m,QB, Q
S
B, signB(m)) whereas Bob publishes (m,QA, Q
S
A, signA(m)) in
his history.
A
reation of a seure hannel (IBE Sheme)
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ B
A
reate a message m=`IDA and IDB trust one to eah other'
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ B
A
A signs m with IBS
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ B
A
B signs m with IBS
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− B
In an idential manner, we an onsider that when Bob enounters Charlie, they proeed as above
B
reation of a seure hannel (IBE Sheme)
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ C
B
reate a message m'=`IDB and IDC trust one to eah other'
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ C
B
B signs m' with IBS
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ C
B
C signs m' with IBS
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− C
When Alie meets Charlie and one to eah other want to prove that they have respetively met before
Bob, they exhange their publi values in their histories and Charlie, rst, proves to Alie that Bob trust
him using m'.
A
did you meet Bob before ?
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ C
A
(signB(m
′),KpB )←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− C
veries m'
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The same proess is repeated for Alie. This protool permits to guarantee the traditional ryptographi
properties: authentiity (as Charlie knows the Bob's publi key, he ould authentiate his signature),
integrity is guaranteed by the hash funtion used in the IBS sheme as in the lassial ase of a ertiate,
ondentiality is guaranteed by the seure hannel. The seure hannel built at the beginning of the
exhange in the rst step also prevents a man in the middle attak:the reiproal authentiation between
Alie and Bob is done by their own trust bond and the seret is only known by the onerned nodes and
has been arefully exhanged using a publi key ipher method based on IBE.
Notie also that due to the partiular struture of the built message, we ould easily add some semanti
notions in this message and prove the assoiated keywords used.
2.3 First studies onerning the size of the history
The seond part of our study onern the required size of the history in the following ontext: suppose
that inside a large group of nodes, you have a partiular ommunity that often interats, the number
of ommon nodes in the history and the size of the history itself must preserve this ommunity (joined
together for a semanti purpose as musi disussion,...) without drowning it in the large group of nodes.
In other words, the hosen parameters must be arefully designed in order to prevent ommunities from
disappearing or from being obliged to always fore the interations by the hand.
2.3.1 Probabilisti approah
We onsider here that the size of the history is k and depends on the total number n′ of nodes for a given
imprinting station. We suppose that the size of the small ommunity is n. We then want to estimate the
required number p of ommon nodes in the history to permit the aess to some servies. We suppose in
this subsetion that the nodes meetings are random and does not depend on some laws of proximity. A
more sophistiate random graph will be studied in the simulation paragraph.
When two nodes A and B, belonging to the same small ommunity, meet eah other and want to
know the number of ommon nodes they have in their own histories. They ould exhange some servies
if they have at least p ommon nodes in their history of size k. We want that the probability that the
previous event happens is very high otherwise, this probability must be low.
Those two probabilities derive in fat from the same omputation that is the following in the ase
of a group of size n: we rst ompute the probability that they have exatly i ommon nodes in their
histories. This probability is given by :
(ni)(
n−i
k−i)(
n−k
k−i)
((nk))2
. (This orresponds to the way to take i values
inside n possibles and then the k − i staying values inside the n − i nodes and last the k − i values
inside those that do not belong to the history i.e. n − k.) This formula is true if k − p ≤ n − k i.e.
p ∈ {max(2k − n, 0), k} (the size of the history must be upper bounded by n/2).
We then dedue the probability that A and B have at most p ommon knowledges (exluding p):
1
((nk))2
·
∑p−1
i=0
(
n
i
)
·
(
n−i
k−i
)
·
(
n−k
k−i
)
.
And then, the probability P they have at least p ommon knowledges is given by:
P = Pr(A ∩B ≥ p) = 1−
1
(
(
n
k
)
)2
·
p−1∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
·
(
n− i
k − i
)
·
(
n− k
k − i
)
(1)
This probability stays true in the ase where the nodes only belongs to the same domain and where n is
replaed by n′. We all this probability P ′.
We have omputed those probabilities onsidering that we want that P ′ must be high and P low. We
obtain the following results aording the p and k values.
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n′ n k p P P'
30 100 6 3 0,2 % 7,6 %
30 100 8 3 1,6 % 35,5 %
30 100 10 3 6 % 74,9 %
30 100 12 3 15,5 % 96,2 %
30 100 6 4 0 % 0,7 %
30 100 8 4 0,1 % 10,3 %
30 100 10 4 0,8 % 43,96 %
30 100 12 4 3,56 % 83,3 %
30 100 6 6 0 % 0 %
30 100 8 6 0 % 0,1 %
30 100 10 6 0 % 4 %
30 100 12 6 0 % 29,6 %
2.3.2 Simulation approah
The KAA model is dediated to smart devies, therefore suh devies are belonging to a person and so
resulting interation graph is a soial graph. Soial graphs have been studied for a long time, rst by
soiologists and more reently by mathematiians.
The rst property of soial graph is the small world eet. This property means that even in soial
graph strongly geographial (so with insular part or soial barriers) there exists short onneting path.
More reently, some works emphasize reurrent lustering organization whih an also aet the way
soial graph should be studied. The last property, whih is very important for simulation, is the skewed
degree distribution.
In order to study the p parameter of the KAA trust model we use random graph with skewed distribu-
tion. The sequene of degree is obtained through an exponential and ontinuous power-law distribution
generator.
The aim of our simulation is to provide basi idea to verify the orret hoie of the p parameter for a
given ommunity. The goal is to hoose the right p parameter that give large probability of spontaneous
interation between nodes of the ommunity and low probability of interation between a node not
belonging to the same ommunity. This empirial approah need the knowledge of the ommunity,
in term of degree distribution. Most of ommunity speiation are arbitrary. This is a rst step to
automati - or semi automati, onguration a KAA model for a spei ommunity.
Let us suppose a ommunity denoted C of 30 nodes interating inside a soial group G(V,E) of
|V | = 100 nodes, inluding the C ommunity. We suppose that interations are more frequent between
nodes of C than between a node of C and a node of G\C. Therefore, G also onstitutes a soial group
and has same general properties. In our simulations, we dene a ommunity with 4 parameters: s the
size of the ommunity, dmin and dmax orresponding to the range of possible degrees of nodes, and α the
exponent of the power-law distribution funtion. Here the parameters both of C and G:
Nodes dmin dmin α
C 30 6 12 2.4
G 100 5 10 2.4
In order to evaluate the ohesion of the ommunity, we dene a notion of distane between nodes of
the ommunity. We say that y ∈ C is in the neighborhood of x ∈ C if there exists an edge between x and
y in the graph of C (a trust relation have been already established). We all this rst ring neighborhood
V1 and generalize this notion as follow:
V1(x) = {y|∃x, (x, y) ∈ E}
Vi(x) = {y|∃z1, · · · zp, (x, zi) ∈ E and (zi, y) ∈ E}
⋃
Vi−1(x)
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Figure 1: Impat of the p parameter of the size of the neighborhood.
Therefore, with the same p parameter, we do not wont suh properties to be easily transmitted to
nodes outside of C. In our experiments, usually 1 or 2 nodes from G\C are at distane less 4 to a node
of C with p > 3. Our model seems to be rather resistant to automati inorporation of nodes out of the
initial ommunity.
3 Reputation Model
3.1 Semanti of the history ontent
First, we observe that eah interation is asymmetri with a sender terminal and a reeiver terminal
that reeives the asked servie. Even in a ollaborative ation, it is possible to isolate eah ation in an
asymmetri way. If we onsider this asymmetri notion in the reation of an element of the history, we
ould extrat from this fat a semanti value that will lead our trust poliy.
We also assume here that there exists no protool that permits to guarantee a simultaneous exhange
for the generation of a history element in eah terminal and that there is no mehanism that guarantees
that the generation of a history element will really take plae. Moreover, as soon as a terminal refuses
this generation (beause it's against its own poliy or beause it is a heater node), no history element
will be generated.
If we take into aount all the previous remarks, we then study the dierent poliies that ongure
a node reation. Clearly, we have to fore the history elements generation in order to enrih the global
network using initations. We also take into aount the human reiproal behavior in suh ontext as
proved by the reations observed in experimental eonomi games or in the peer-to-peer networks where
the rst aim is the existene of the network.
3.1.1 The generation mehanism for the history elements.
The rst step onsists of deiding at whih moment the generation of a history element will begin. Of
ourse, this generation ould not happen before the exhange of servies due to the fat that a heater
node ould build a history without providing servies and in this ase, the model would not be anymore
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a trust framework. So, the generation of the history elements must be performed after the servie real-
ization. In this part, we do not integrate a semanti value for all possible servies. We just onsider here
a suessful interation where the servie is really provided.
It seems logial that the node that rst gives a history element is the node that reeives the servie
from another. Thus, a terminal with a rih history ould interat more easily with others.
Then, our algorithm ould be written as follows:
 First step (1): suppose that the node A (the reeiver) asks the node B (the provider) for a
partiular servie.
 Seond step (2): The node B ould provide the servie to the node A. In this ase, the message
formed to be signed by the two parties in presene will be m ='B provided a servie to A'. In
the ase where the servie is not furnished by B, the algorithm stops here. We all this property
spA(B)='servie property'.
 Third step (3): The node A ould enrih the history of B by signing and sending to B the message
m. In this ase, we say that A is a trustor and we all this property the tpB(A)='trustor property'.
If the node A does not provide the history element, the algorithm stops due to the 'non trustor
property'.
 Fourth step (4): The node B has previously reeived from the node A the tpB(A) and it ould
be reiproal: it ould provide to the node A a history element signing and sending the message
m. We all this property rpA(B) ='reiproal property'. Of ourse, the node B is not obliged to
provide this history element and ould verify the 'non reiproal property'.
This algorithm is illustrated on the following gure:
A
asks B for a servie
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ B (1)
A
B provided the servie
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− B (2)
A
A signs m=B provided a servie to A
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ B (3)
A
B signs m=B provided a servie to A
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− B (4)
In step (3), B keeps signA(m) while A keeps signB(m) in step (4).
One this algorithm is implemented, we need to add the following remarks on the ryptographi
protool used:
 the node A is not obliged to provide the tpB(A) property.
 the same remark holds for the rpA(B) property.
 The ryptographi protool used guarantees that the history element ould only be used by the
node that reeives this element (nodes A and B here).
 The only santion that a node ould take if it is not satised by an ation (the non sp, non tp or
non rp properties) is to blaklist the non trusted node. This ation implies that the non trusted
node ould no more interat with the deeived node. (We suppose here that a blaklist operation
will only take plae after a threshold of non trusted interations).
 The KAA framework supposes that there is no reommendation model and that no entral authority
ould at for additional santions.
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3.1.2 Semanti notions.
For an interation suh the one previously desribed in setion 3.1.1 between two nodes A (reeiver) and
B (provider), some semanti notions ould be released for eah node.
The history element reeived by B ontains the following semanti notions:
 B provided a servie to A: spA(B) property.
 A was a trustor for B: tpB(A) property.
The history element reeived by A ontains the following semanti notions:
 B provided a servie to A: spA(B) property.
 A was a trustor for B: tpB(A) property.
 B was reiproal for A: rpA(B) property.
Of ourse, A is inited to be a trustor beause this is the only way to enrih its own history. But, a
free rider behavior ould also be attended. However, B has not a real interest to be reiproal exept if
it takes into aount the general enrihment of the network and of its personal reputation with A rst
and with the others if a reputation mehanism is set up.
Notie rst that all the two last properties are proved by the ryptographi algorithm used in our
model, even if we ould not prove an interation with no exhange of history elements. The two elements
of history built on the two exhanges will be, from now, alled trustor proof for the rst one and reiproal
proof for the seond one.
When two terminals enter in an interative session, they will inverse the two roles during the session
and will possess the two elements of history.
3.2 Reputation model
The KAA framework objets the idea of a reommendation mehanism, the trust being onsidered in our
model in a non transitive way. Indeed, the main priniple of the KAA framework is to base our poliy
only upon ryptographi provable elements. Consequently, a node ould not reeive a reommendation
for a node that it has never met before beause there is no simple and loal means to prove the semanti
of this reommendation.
However, the KAA framework permits the management of a reputation mehanism, loally omputed,
as soon as it will be based upon provable elements. First, as we notied before, the interations ould
happen between nodes of the same ommunity or between nodes from dierent ommunities and ould
also be proved.
The omputation of the reputation value of the node A for the node B ould be performed using the
following informations omputed at two levels:
 Diret The node A keeps the memory of past interations between A and B, using the semanti
values generated from the history elements. This information ould be proved by a third party who
has already met B. We suppose that history elements are marked by a time stamp else the trust
bond is denitely aquired. The history element will only indiate the quality of the sequene and
the number of past interations with a single node ('trustor proof', 'reiproal proof' or both in ase
of an exhange). This number ould not be transfered beause it is not provable. All those values
are ryptographially proved and this model avoids some nodes oalitions to destroy the reputation
of one node. The node A that is onvined by those elements ould derived from those values a
reputation value for the node B.
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 Indiret When A interats with a new node C, they exhange whole or parts of their histories. If
they have B as a ommon knowledge, A ould reeive from C the semanti of the past interations
between B and C ('trustor proof', 'reiproal proof' or the both). The node A ould take into
aount those values to update its own reputation value for B. Of ourse, there is no information
about the quantity of previous interations that C has built with B. This bonus of reputation ould
be taken into aount only one for eah orrespondent other than B and that presents B in its own
history.
We ould then notie that the trust indiret poliy does not violate the bases of the KAA framework:
we only use trust values that have been ryptographially proved. It is impossible to reate by its own
an entry in the reputation table for a partiular node never met before. Moreover, this reputation model
is an initation to be reiproal and let a proof of good behavior in the histories of nodes met before.
Thus, the nodes ould hope to have a good reputation for a lot of system nodes.
3.3 Some elements for a trust poliy
As previously desribed, the aim of the KAA projet is to build a framework for many trust management
systems rather than a spei one. With the two basi mehanisms of the KAA model - namely ommon
history and reputation - one may build a wide range of trust poliy. Let us sum up rst all parameters
that an be adapted. Adaptation an be stati, depending of the soial pattern the user of the smart
devie is belonging to or dynami depending of the ontext of use.
The main parameter of the KAA model is the size of the ommon history a node requires to aept an
interation. Note that, there exists an asymmetry in interations and the size of the ommon knowledge
required to be reeiver or to be provider not needs to be the same. Also the fat that the orresponding
node belongs or does not belong to the same ommunity (seurity domain) may also have an impat of
that. For intra domain relationship, the size of the ommon history required is learly related to the size
of the ommunity.
We have omputed the orresponding probability of suess in a suh ase and, inspired from the
birthday paradox, have observed that for a given group of size n, if the size k of the history is n/ ln(n)
and the threshold number p of ommon knowledges is about
√
n/ ln(n) then the probability of suess
(here to reate a trust link) is greater than 50%. So, for example, if n = 100, k = 22 and p = 5, the
suess probability is about 56, 6% (for the same parameters and p = 3, this probability reahs 92%). In
this ase, we ould see that the size k of the history is reasonable and ould be easily arried by eah
node and that the number of veriations to perform given by the p value is also not exessive.
With those requirements, we need also to tell that the history works on the priniple of a rush FIFO:
the rst input of the history orresponds with the rst output when the history is full.
So the node A ould use the previous remarks to build a trust poliy based upon the following notions:
 Diret (for a node): number of meetings with a node, number of trustor proofs, number of
reiproal proofs, number of servies refused, last enounter ommon knowledge size, date of the
last blaklist enter.
 Indiret (for a node): number of enountered nodes arrying a trustor proof, number of enoun-
tered nodes arrying a reiproal proof, number of enountered nodes arrying both trustor/reiproal
proof.
3.4 Soial pattern examples
Our trust poliy depends on the type of exhange as dened in setion 1.1 and is based upon the soial
patterns. To reah this aim, we have dened two partiular modes of operation: a losed mode where, as
in the human soiety (the family for example), the trust pre-exists and in our model, the ryptographi
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veriations are not required and an open mode, where the trust bond need to be established using the
CKE protool. This mode ould be used for example in an organization pattern as a ompany. Aording
the size of the ompany and the inurred risk, trust poliy will adjust the parameters previously dened
and the required number of ommon knowledges.
 Family: a ommunity with a strong soial distane and a strong degree of struture works in the
losed mode.
 Network: a ommunity with a strong soial distane and a weak degree of struture works in the
open mode using a weak authentiation for the nodes meetings.
 Market: To implement a Market-like ommunity, a money (either virtual or not) is required.
Therefore, it is possible to add a semanti value to trustor proof and reiproal proof based on the
notion of market. If you add the value of the transation in both proofs, you an ahieve this goal.
The trustor proof and reiproal proof an be automatially generated when the transation took
plae (seurity of this transation is out of the sope of this paper).
 Organization: In an organization pattern as a ompany, the losed mode is used with a strong
authentiation delivered by the imprinting station through lassial ertiation. We ould also
integrate the hierarhial parameter in our model: for example, if someone wants to talk to a
leader, the required number of ommon history elements need to be larger than if he wants to talk
to a person at the same level than him.
Our model is also an inter domain framework: for example, a losed ommunity ould at being
altruist. This ommunity always provides the asked servies but it is never reiproal to preserve itself:
it does not want to inrease the number of the history elements of the outer nodes in order to prevent
those nodes from entering inside the ommunity.
4 Further Works
4.1 Trust poliies
From a trust deision yle point of view, [10℄ shows that trust ould be seen as a omsumer/provider
one-way relationship beause it denes a set of distint properties for eah entity involved in the exhange.
Eah entity ould beome a onsumer, a provider or the both at the same time. Then, the trust rela-
tionship between a onsumer and a provider translates a set of ations or just a single one-to-one ation
[9℄. Eah ation possesses its own intention and its own objetive. The intention denes the ativity of
the onsumer on the provider and an take three states: positive, negative or suspet aording to the
math between the intention and the trust poliy. The objetive notion desribes the ativity type of the
entity. Thus, a onsumer shows its positive intention if its objetive is only, for example, to print a le
on the provider's printer but it shows its negative intention if its objetive is to injet a virus ode on the
onsumer's laptop.
The trust relationship of a provider-toward-onsumer's system is a proess whih modies the initial
state of the provider's system into a resultant state (onsequene of the ation) neessarily onform with
the rules established by the provider. Those rules desribe the trust poliy of the entity, seen as a provider
or a onsumer. For [9℄, those rules are built for eah entity from an opinion notion, a judgment onept
and some reommendation mehanisms. The opinion notion as desribed in [12℄ ombines belief, unbelief
and ignorane values for eah ation or for eah entity in order to onstrut a reommendation. This
aspet is very diult to measure. To see those three values as some boolean ones taking 'True', 'False'
or 'I don't know' is the easiest representation. Moreover, other fators inuene the opinion that the
provider builds upon the onsumer as the past experiene sharing (the history in our ase) or the gain
or the loss inherently arried by the ation. [5℄, [10℄ show that the deision yle must lead to a deision.
This one is a boolean value that exists if and only if eah entity takes the same deision. However, if only
RR n° 0123456789
18 Galie & Legrand & Minier & Mullins & Ubéda
a single entity takes an opposite deision, the exhange is loked. So, to prevent a suh situation from
happening, a negotiator model ould be implemented. This mehanism ensures that all the exhange
neessary onditions are olleted and it provides one or many trade-os. Those trade-o mehanisms
are going to take into aount some new parameters as the history of previous interations, the number
of suh interations and an evaluation of those meetings.
The deision life yle regulation beomes the diulty of a suh model and we think that the trust
poliies ould be ompared with a ontrat negotiated between both a onsumer and a provider. With this
intention, a risk management model seems to be the most onvenient representation to express deision
management trust poliies based upon deisions.
Our main goal is to dene trust poliies in order to express the notion of risk management through
the eets on the system state that a partiular ativity ould imply. The deision making proess
will be inuened by several riteria suh as the experiene that onstitutes the inheritane of the entity
knowledge. The deision life yle is represented by three fundamental notions that guarantee the deision
making:
 The environment analyze that leads to the knowledge of the exhange ontext.
 The knowledge that represents the experiment learned near the entities previously met.
 The trust poliies also alled dogma that dene the rules set previously learned to regulate the
trust. As proposed in [5℄ and [10℄, the risk poliies take into aount the ost of the resoures
furnished by the provider and the exposition of this partiular resoures.
Risk management applied into our trust model must respet many riteria desribed below:
 First, exhange depends diretly and always on its ontext; this means that entity is able to disover
its urrent ontext, then take it into aount in its analysis and still in its deision proess. We
believe that adaptive trust protool is an essential funtionality.
 Seond as desribed before, we must distinguish two types of entities exhange aording intention
and objetive: the onsumer type entity and seond the provider type entity. So an entity an be
the both.
 Third, an entity must be able to implement a relation even if no entity of its environment is known
by it. The deision making mehanism must solve this aspet and exeed the seurity poliy that
leads most of the time on the deision of a bloked exhange.
 Fourth, the notion of aquired experiment (the history in our ase) will distinguish four onditions
and four trust poliies aording to the entity performs its rst exhange, performs its rst exhange
with a given entity (the exhange is authorized beause the number of previous meetings with some
ommon nodes is upper a given threshold or the exhange is not authorized beause the ondition
of the trust poliy is not met), has previously exhanged with this entity. For example, in ase of
a rst exhange, our deision poliy must be able to take into aount a loss of experiment. The
notion of share experiment will be a main aspet of our trust poliy.
 Fifth, two entities that deide to exhange must be able to modify their personal judgments aord-
ing some external informations. Those informations depend on the ontext and an be inreasingly
personal for an entity or a ommunity. In suh a ontext, we dene the notion of the semanti of
the exhange that will enrih in a ner way the deision making proess.
We are able now to represent the trust management proess implemented in the deision making
proess:
 updates of the trust riteria.
 history management.
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 ontrol management using a pro-ative mehanism.
 deision making proess with an adapted language.
 negotiation of the relation onditions.
 relation onditions making proess.
 detetion of the riteria neessary for the trust negotiation.
Our aim is also to introdue a poliy language and to use it in our trust struture to dene a deisional
semanti in our model.
4.2 Formal proof
The main dierene between the informal notion of history-based explored in the soial sienes and
formality needed for omputing is that in the end, our model has to be operational. Also, this model
has to be twofold: rst, to inlude a notion of protool to desribe the exat behavior of systems, whih
is fundamental when seurity is onerned and seond, to allow nodes' interations to feedbak to the
seurity mehanisms and inuene future poliies. Also, we propose a formal model for history-based
trust management systems in ambient networks providing these two aims. In this model, a node will be
then speied by a pair, a poliy α and and a protool P interating in the following way. The poliy
α informs the protool P about what ations are allowed at any moment and works on the basis of the
history of past interations. Dually, P interats with the network of other ambients and doing so, it
produes the observations gathered in α. The poliy will be speied with a deidable logi while the
protool will be modeled with a proess alulus à la pi-alulus.
Conlusion
In the ontext of Ambient network, mobiles will often beome disonneted from their home networks
and will have to handle unforeseen irumstanes. The mobile needs to arry self-ontained informations
and methods to be able to make fully autonomous seurity deisions. In this paper, we present a general
framework for managing trust in a fully distributed environment. We propose to reord the resulting
data of the interation of mobiles in a History. These data are made seure by ryptography tools. Then
when two nodes enounter themselves for the rst time, an interation ould take plae if the number of
ommon trusted nodes is greater than a speied threshold. We onsider that our approah is relevant
by the fat that history is seure and it is not-transferable exept against the lone attak. The Common
History Extration is a protool designed both to generate elements of history and also to verify their
authentiity: it is a full part of the deision-making proess. Based on the ellipti urves, our protool
may be embedded in small devies suh as PDA or smart phones.
We have also shown how these data should be ombined to build a exible trust management depending
on the ontext: semanti values may be added to elements of history and that allows our protool to be
in adequay with many real environments. Mobiles will have the apability to interat aording to their
trust poliies sine they will share the same ryptographi material although they belong to dierent
domains.To sum up, the key feature of our framework is that trust is based on a loal reputation system
and is build on the own-experiene of the mobiles.
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A Bilinear pairings
Here we briey give properties of a ryptographi bilinear map whih is a modied Weil pairing [3℄. A
ryptographi bilinear pairing is dened as e : G1 × G1 → G2 where G1 is an additive yli group of
prime order q, G2 is a multipliative yli group of the same order and P is an arbitrary generator of
G1. An admissible bilinear pairing has the following properties :
 Bilinear: e(aR, bS) = e(R,S)ab ∀R,S ∈ G1 and a, b ∈ Z
∗
q . This an be restated as ∀R,S, T ∈ G1,
e(R+ S, T ) = e(R, T )e(S, T ) and e(R,S + T ) = e(R,S)e(R, T ).
 Non-degenerate: There exists R,S ∈ G1 suh that e(R,S) 6= IG2 where IG2 denotes the identity
element of the group G2.
 Computable: There exists an eient algorithm to ompute e(R,S) ∀R,S ∈ G1.
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